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Cap-and-trade systems have emerged as the preferred national and regional instrument for reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases throughout the industrialized world, and the Clean Development Mechanism
— an international emission-reduction-credit system — has developed a substantial constituency,
despite some concerns about its performance.  Because linkage between tradable permit systems can
reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade
systems to each other, as well as to the CDM and other credit systems.  We examine the benefits and
concerns associated with various types of linkages, and analyze the near-term and long-term role that
linkage may play in a future international climate policy architecture.  In particular, we evaluate linkage
in three potential roles:  as an independent bottom-up architecture, as a step in the evolution of a top-down
architecture, and as an ongoing element of a larger climate policy agreement.  We also assess how
the policy elements of climate negotiations can facilitate or impede linkages.  Our analysis throughout
is both positive and normative.
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1Such linkage of domestic tradable permit systems is completely different from the state-to-state trading envisaged under
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, whereby signatories to the Protocol can trade their “assigned amounts.”
1
LINKAGE OF TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS
IN





As the nations of the world consider alternative international climate policy architectures for the
post-2012 period, tradable permit systems are emerging as a preferred domestic instrument for reducing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  The two most significant institutions for reducing GHG emissions
implemented to date — the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) — are tradable permit systems.  Furthermore, tradable permit systems
are being considered as the primary policy instrument for reducing GHG emissions in Australia, Canada,
Japan, and the United States, among other countries.  
Due to the increasingly likely prospect of a world with multiple tradable permit systems,
attention has focused on how and whether to link these systems.  Linking occurs when a tradable permit
system’s regulatory authority allows regulated entities to use emission allowances or emission reduction
credits from another system in order to meet their domestic compliance obligations.
1  These entities can
then take advantage of the cost savings from international trade:  just as allowance trading within a
tradable permit system allows higher-cost emission reductions to be replaced by lower-cost reductions
within that system, trading across systems allows higher-cost reductions to be replaced by lower-cost
reductions from a different system.  These cost savings create significant incentives for regulatory
authorities to link tradable permit systems, but there are also some reasonable concerns about linkage,
such as impacts on global emissions and on national control over allowance prices.
We examine the benefits and concerns associated with international linkage, and analyze how
linkage may become part — possibly a central part — of the post-2012 international climate policy
architecture.  Section 2 introduces the two general categories of tradable permit systems:  cap-and-trade
and emission-reduction-credit systems.  Section 3 reviews existing and proposed GHG tradable permit
systems.  Section 4 describes the major types of linkages and provides examples of existing linkages.
Section 5 examines the general implications of linkage, including potential benefits and concerns.2
Section 6 discusses the role that linking of tradable permit systems may play in future
international policy architectures, both in the near-term and in the long-term.  Section 7 provides an
evaluation of linkage in three specific roles:  as an independent bottom-up architecture, as a step in the
evolution of a top-down architecture, and as an element of a larger policy architecture.  In section 8, we
examine how the policy elements of near-term climate negotiations could affect the prospects for
linkage.  Finally, section 9 concludes.
2.  Categories of Tradable Permit Systems
  Because the implications of linking depend on the type of tradable permit systems that are
linked, it is essential to distinguish between two categories of systems:  cap-and-trade and emission-
reduction-credit systems.
2.1 Cap-and-Trade Systems
A cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a
limited number of tradable emission allowances, which emission sources are required to secure and
surrender in number equal to their emissions.  Faced with the choice between surrendering an allowance
or reducing their emissions, firms will choose whichever option is less expensive.  As long as trading
costs are low and allowance markets are sufficiently competitive, trading will lead firms to put
allowances to their highest-valued use —  that is, covering those emissions that are most costly to reduce
— regardless of how the allowances are initially distributed (Stavins 1995; Hahn 1984).  Conversely, the
opportunity to trade allowances ensures that the emissions reductions undertaken to meet the cap are
those that are the least costly to achieve.
In developing a cap-and-trade system, policymakers must decide on several design elements
(Stavins 2008).  Policymakers must determine how many allowances they will issue, which defines the
system’s cap.  Policymakers must also determine the scope of the cap’s coverage, or what emission
sources and types of GHG emissions will be subjected to the overall cap.  A related decision regards
the system’s point of regulation.  A cap on energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions can be
enforced by requiring fossil fuel suppliers to surrender allowances for the carbon content of their fuel
sales (“upstream regulation”), or by requiring final emitters to surrender allowances for their emissions
(“downstream regulation”).
Policymakers also must determine how to distribute allowances.  Allowances can be freely
distributed or auctioned, or a combination of the two approaches can be employed.  If allowances are
freely distributed, there are limitless possible methods for determining who receives them, and how
many allowances each recipient receives.  Finally, policymakers must decide on several features of the
cap-and-trade system relating to monitoring, reporting, and enforcement of compliance.
A key concern in many countries developing mandatory climate policies is uncertainty regarding
compliance costs.  In the context of a cap-and-trade system, this concern is often expressed as concern
about the level and volatility of allowance prices.  In response to this concern, much attention has been
given to the opportunity to include “cost-containment” measures in cap-and-trade systems, such as2For a discussion of these and other cost-containment proposals, see:  Tatsutani and Pizer 2008.
3For example, a credit system may set individual emissions limits for firms, and allow them to generate tradable credits if
they reduce their emissions below their assigned limit.  Such a system would be essentially identical to a cap-and-trade system
where each firm is allocated a quantity of allowances that reflects its specific emissions limit.
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offset provisions, allowance banking and borrowing, and safety-valve provisions.
2  An offset provision
allows regulated entities to offset some of their emissions with credits from emission reduction measures
that are outside the cap-and-trade system’s scope of coverage.  Banking allows firms to save unused
allowances for use in future years.  Borrowing allows firms to use allowances that will be issued in future
years to demonstrate compliance in an earlier year.  Both banking and borrowing allow firms flexibility
to shift emission reduction efforts over time to minimize costs.
A safety valve puts an upper bound on the compliance costs that firms will incur by offering
them the option of paying a predetermined fee (the safety-valve “trigger price”) to purchase additional
allowances.  In its simplest form, a safety valve introduces a tradeoff between avoiding unexpectedly
high costs and achieving a system’s emissions target.  When a safety valve is exercised, firms’ emissions
exceed the number of allowances that were initially distributed.  However, this tradeoff can be mitigated
(or potentially eliminated) through provisions such as reducing subsequent years’ caps in response to
use of the safety valve (Stavins 2008).
2.2 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems
 
An emission-reduction-credit system brings about emission reductions by awarding tradable
credits for certified emissions reductions.  Some programs that are described as credit systems can be
quite similar to a cap-and-trade system.
3  When we refer to credit systems, we are describing systems that
have a few key differentiating characteristics.  First, participation in the systems is voluntary.  Second,
the systems serve only as a source of credits that can be used by entities facing compliance obligations
in other systems.  They do not themselves impose any obligations on entities to hold or surrender
credits.  Third, the systems grant credits for particular projects based on an estimate of how those
projects reduce emissions from some agreed-upon baseline level of what emissions would have been
if the projects had not been carried out.
In designing a credit system, policymakers must determine what types of emission sources and
actions can be awarded credits. For example, certain emission reduction projects may be excluded from
consideration due to concern about the feasibility of measuring results accurately.  Also, policymakers
must decide on a method for calculating the number of credits that are awarded.  These calculations can
be performed on a project-by-project basis, or they can be based on standards applied to all projects of
a particular type.  In either case, it is necessary to estimate what baseline emissions would have been
absent the credited action.
3.  Greenhouse Gas Tradable Permit Systems
Although there are only a limited number of existing GHG tradable permit systems, the list of
planned and prospective systems is considerably longer.  It is the increasing number and prominence4For an assessment of the EU ETS as a model of a potential future international climate policy architecture, see the paper
prepared by Denny Ellerman for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements.  For an analysis of the
performance of the EU ETS, see the symposium of three articles in the Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,
Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 2007.
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of such systems, and the economic and political incentives to link them that provide the motivation for
our analysis of linkage as a potential element of the post-2012 international policy architecture.  Hence,
we provide a brief review of some of the major existing, planned, and proposed systems.
3.1 Cap-and-Trade Systems
3.1.1 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world’s largest GHG
cap-and-trade system.  Phase I of the EU ETS, from 2005 to 2007, capped aggregate CO2 emissions
from more than 11,000 industrial facilities and electricity generators in 25 European countries
(European Commission 2005).  Those sources collectively emitted approximately two billion metric tons
of CO2 in 2005, about 45 percent of the EU’s CO2 emissions (European Commission 2005, 2007b).
The EU ETS cap has been tightened for Phase II, which runs from 2008 to 2012.  Also, the scope of
the EU ETS has been expanded to cover new sources in countries that participated in Phase I, and to
include sources in Bulgaria and Romania, which acceded to the EU in 2007.
4  The European Union
plans to extend the EU ETS to 2020 (European Commission 2008).
3.1.2 Norwegian Emissions Trading Systems
A Norwegian emissions trading system began operation at the same time as the EU ETS.  From
2005 to 2007, it covered a relatively small set of industrial sources accounting for just 10 to 15 percent
of Norway’s GHG emissions (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 2005).    Norway has since
agreed to adjust its system to conform to the rules and procedures of the EU ETS, with which it will
be linked.  These adjustments include broadening the scope of emission sources that are covered, such
that Norway’s system will cover approximately 40 percent of its GHG emissions (Euractiv.com 2007).
3.1.3 Japan’s Emissions Trading System 
Japan has had a Voluntary Emissions Trading System (JVETS) in operation since April,  2006,
but participating facilities have accounted for no more than a few million tons of Japan’s annual GHG
emissions, which exceeded 1.3 billion metric tons in 2004 (Sudo 2006;  Japanese Ministry of the
Environment 2006).  After considerable national discussion and debate, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda
announced in June 2008 that the government would employ a cap-and-trade system as its main
instrument to achieve ambitious reduction targets of 60 to 80 percent below current levels by 2050
(ABC News 2008).  A trial trading period for CO2 emissions is scheduled to begin in October of 2008
(BusinessGreen 2008).5The participants are:  Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont.
5
3.1.4 Australia’s Proposed System
In 2004, the States and Territories of Australia established the National Emissions Trading
Taskforce (NETT) to develop a proposal for a cap-and-trade system, which was released in August 2006
(National Emissions Trading Taskforce 2006).  In December 2006, Prime Minister Howard established
his Task Group on Emissions Trading, which issued a report in May 2007 proposing a nationwide
cap-and-trade system that would have the broadest practicable coverage of Australia’s GHG emissions
(Australian Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading 2007).
With the change in government in December, 2007, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd lent his support
for the implementation of a cap-and-trade system by 2010 (and for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol).
In July, 2008, the Australian government released a green paper with its detailed plan for a national cap-
and-trade system to reduce CO2 emissions 60 percent below 2000 levels by 2050 (Australian
Government 2008).  Based upon feedback from stakeholders, the government intends to release a white
paper and to draft implementing legislation by the end of 2008.
3.1.5 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and Other Regional Efforts in the United States
In 2005, seven northeastern U.S. states agreed to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI), which three additional northeastern states subsequently joined.
5  The program is
expected to begin in 2009, and would introduce a cap-and-trade system for electricity generators within
the ten states.  The first auction of RGGI allowances was completed on September 25, 2008.  The
program is intended to place an aggregate cap on covered generators’ emissions equal to nearly 190
million tons of CO2 per year from 2009 to 2014, a level roughly comparable to those generators’ recent
emissions.  From 2015 to 2018, the cap would be reduced by 2.5 percent per year. 
In addition to RGGI, other regional and state efforts to limit GHGs in the United States have
begun.  One of the most prominent has resulted from California’s enactment of its Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006, which set a statewide GHG emissions limit for 2020 equal to California’s 1990
emissions level.  In its June 2008 draft “scoping plan,”  California’s Air Resources Board (2008) included
a statewide cap-and-trade system for all energy-related CO2 emissions as one of the key elements of its
preliminary recommendations for achieving the 2020 target. 
3.1.6 Proposals for a Federal Cap-and-Trade System in the United States 
Several bills proposing a federal GHG cap-and-trade system were introduced in the 110th U.S.
Congress.  The proposals differed in many important respects, including the cap’s scope of coverage,
the level of the cap, and the measures that are proposed to address cost uncertainty.  It appears
increasingly likely that a meaningful, upstream, economy-wide cap-and-trade system will be adopted by
the United States in 2009 or 2010.  In 2008, both presidential candidates — Senators John McCain and
Barack Obama — expressed enthusiastic support for such an approach.6For example, under certain circumstances (and to a limited extent), regulated entities could use CERs to meet their
compliance obligations under the RGGI system (RGGI 2007a).
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3.1.7 Proposed Canadian System
The Canadian Government has announced its intention to implement a regulation requiring
reductions in the emissions intensity of major stationary sources of GHG emissions in Canada, which
together account for about half of Canada’s GHG emissions (Environment Canada 2008).  Regulated
sources would be required to achieve an 18 percent reduction in their emissions intensity from 2006
levels by 2010, and an additional 2 percent reduction in each year thereafter.  In meeting their
compliance obligations, among other compliance options, regulated sources could rely on emissions
trading with other sources that have reduced their emissions intensity by more than the required
amount. 
3.2 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems
3.2.1 Clean Development Mechanism
Established under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the most
significant GHG emission-reduction-credit system to-date.  Under the CDM, certified emission
reductions (CERs) are awarded for voluntary emission reduction projects in developing countries that
ratified the Protocol, but are not among the Annex I countries subject to the Protocol’s emissions
limitation commitments.  While CERs can be used by Annex B Parties to the Protocol — the 37
industrialized countries and emerging market economies of central and eastern Europe who took on
targets under the Protocol — to meet their emissions commitments, they could also be used for
compliance purposes by entities covered by various cap-and-trade systems throughout the world,
including systems in countries that are not Parties to the Protocol, such as the United States.
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An Executive Board established under the Kyoto Protocol is responsible for supervising the
CDM and for making determinations about the issuance of CERs for particular projects.  From project
initiation, it can take as long as two or more years to go through that process, and the cost of the process
(not including the cost of the actual emission reduction measures) can be substantial (Nigoff 2006;
Michaelowa and Jotzo 2005).  Nonetheless, as of August 2008, more than 3,000 projects were in the
CDM “project pipeline.”  These projects are expected to generate more than 2.7 billion CERs by the
end of 2012, with each CER reflecting emission reductions of one metric ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent.  The Executive Board had registered more than 1,100 of these projects, expected to yield
1.3 billion CERs by 2012.  Projects in China account for 52 percent of the expected CERs from
registered projects, India 14 percent, Brazil 9 percent, South Korea 7 percent, and projects in 46 other
countries collectively account for the remaining 19 percent (UNFCCC 2008).
3.2.2 Joint Implementation
Like the CDM, Joint Implementation (JI) was established as a project-based flexibility
mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol.  However, unlike the CDM, JI applies to emission reduction
projects carried out in an Annex I country (the host country) that has a national emissions target under7
the Protocol.  JI projects generate credits, referred to as emission reduction units (ERUs), that can be
used to cover increased emissions in other countries.  When these credits are generated, a corresponding
reduction is made in the host country’s emissions target under the Protocol.  This ensures that the use
of ERUs to cover increased emissions in another country is, in fact, offset by a net reduction in the host
country’s emissions. 
JI projects will likely produce far fewer credits than the CDM.  The Joint Implementation
Supervisory Committee began accepting proposals in October 2005 (Pointcarbon 2007).  By August 1,
2008, it had received submissions for only 163 projects, accounting for an estimated 280 million tons
of CO2-equivalent emission reductions over the five years of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment
period (UNEP Risoe Centre 2008).
3.2.3 Domestic Offset Programs 
In designing domestic cap-and-trade systems, governments can establish offset programs for
creating emission reduction credits that can be used by regulated entities to meet compliance obligations.
For example, electricity generators covered by RGGI can use domestic offsets to cover part of their
emissions.  RGGI has established a set of project types that can be implemented to generate offset
credits, as well as standards for determining the number of allowances that projects are awarded (RGGI
2007a).  Cap-and-trade systems proposed in Australia, Canada, and the United States also include offset
programs.
4.  Types of Linkages
The type of link that is established has important implications for its effects.  Direct linkages
between systems can be one-way (unilateral) or two-way (bilateral or multilateral).  Also, while direct
links between systems can be established only as a result of explicit decisions to do so, direct links can
lead to indirect links between systems even absent explicit decisions to link them (Jaffe and Stavins
2007).
4.1 Direct Linkages
In order for a direct linkage to be established between two systems, either one or both systems
must accept the other’s allowances or credits as valid for use in demonstrating compliance in its own
system.
4.1.1 Linkage between a Cap-and-Trade System and Credit System
In a direct link between a cap-and-trade system and a credit system, the cap-and-trade system
chooses to recognize emission reduction credits from the credit system.  Because the credit system does
not place requirements on entities to surrender credits or allowances, this linkage is necessarily one-way.
If the price of credits is lower than the price of emission allowances, then regulated firms in the cap-and-
trade system have an incentive to purchase credits.  This will reduce the price of allowances in the cap-
and-trade system and increase the price of credits in the credit system until the two prices converge.8
4.1.2 Linkages between Cap-and-Trade Systems
Cap-and-trade systems can recognize allowances from other cap-and-trade systems.  The
resulting  linkage can be one-way or two-way, depending on whether the recognition is mutual.
 
In an unrestricted one-way link in which System A recognizes System B’s allowances, if System
A’s allowance price is higher than System B’s, participants in System A will buy allowances from
participants in System B, thereby reducing System A’s allowance price and increasing System B’s price
until the prices converge.  Such trading will increase emissions in A and decrease emissions in B, as
higher cost emission reductions in A are avoided and replaced by lower cost reductions in B.  However,
if System A’s allowance price is lower than System B’s, no trading will result from the one-way link.
Hence, a one-way link in which A recognizes B’s allowances will ensure that A’s allowance price never
exceeds B’s price.
In a two-way direct link, both cap-and-trade systems recognize each other’s allowances, making
it possible for allowances to flow in either direction.  Two-way links can be bilateral or multilateral.  As
the result of a two-way linkage, any difference between the systems’ allowance prices will lead to sales
of allowances from the lower price system to the higher price system until the systems’ allowance prices
converge at an intermediate level, leading to an increase in emissions in the higher price system and an
offsetting reduction in emissions in the lower price system.
If governments place limits on inter-system trading, allowance price convergence may not be
complete.  A government may limit the quantity of allowances from another system that can be used
to demonstrate compliance in its own system.  Alternatively, participants in a system may be allowed
unrestricted use of another system’s allowances, but an “exchange rate” might be applied to their use.
Such a requirement might be used to reconcile differences in the denomination of different systems’
allowances (e.g., metric tons vs. short tons), to reduce inter-system trading, or to ensure that trading
leads to a net reduction in emissions.
4.2 Indirect Linkages
Even if neither system recognizes the other’s allowances, two systems can become indirectly
linked through direct links with a common third system.  As a result of trading between each of the two
systems and the common system, developments in one of the indirectly linked systems can affect the
supply and demand for allowances in the other system.  Hence, changes in the allowance price and
emissions level in one system can affect the allowance price and emissions level in a system with which
it is indirectly linked.
4.2.1 Indirect Linkages Arising from One-way Links between Multiple Cap-and-trade Systems and a Common
Credit System
Indirect links can be created between two cap-and-trade systems if both have one-way links with
a common credit system.  As a result of such one-way links, the two indirectly linked systems will
compete for credits from the third system.  This indirect linkage will reduce the difference between the
two cap-and-trade systems’ allowance prices, as credits will flow to the system with the higher price. 7The European Commission has placed limits on the use of CERs and ERUs in each Member State at a level necessary to
ensure that the total use of CERs and ERUs by each Member State — including, but not limited to use in the EU ETS —
constitutes no more than half of the reductions necessary to meet that Member State's Kyoto target, as modified by the
reallocation of its target under the European Union’s “bubble.”  For a description of the method that the European
Commission employs to determine these limits, see European Commission (2007a), paragraph 6. 
8The threshold price is an inflation-adjusted amount that begins slightly below $11 per ton of CO2 (in 2005 U.S. dollars) and
increases by 2 percent per year in real terms.
9
 In fact, if there is a sufficient supply of credits at a price below the two cap-and-trade system’s pre-link
allowance prices, prices in the three systems will converge fully.
4.2.2 Indirect Linkages Arising from Linkages between Cap-and-Trade Systems
A series of bilateral links among several systems can also create indirect links among those
systems.  This kind of indirect linkage is identical in its effects to a direct multilateral link among all of
the systems involved.  For example, if System A has a two-way link with System B, which has a two-way
link with System C, then trading will lead allowance prices to converge across all three systems even
though A and C are not directly linked. 
4.3 Examples of Existing Linkages
Some linkages have already been established among tradable permit systems for greenhouse
gases, reflecting the strong incentives that governments face to establish these connections.
4.3.1 One-way Linkages
Through its “Linking Directive” (2004/101/EC), the European Commission has allowed EU
ETS participants to use CDM CERs to meet compliance obligations beginning in 2005, and JI ERUs
beginning in 2008 (European Commission 2004).  The Directive places restrictions on this linkage,
however.  CERs and ERUs generated from nuclear facilities, land use change, and forestry activities are
not recognized, and quantitative limits are placed on the use of CERs and ERUs (European
Commission 2007a).
7  The effects of this linkage are already apparent in secondary markets for CERs,
where CER prices have closely tracked Phase II EU ETS allowance prices (Carbonpositive 2007).
In the United States, the Model Rule governing the implementation of the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI) allows for several types of one-way links.  Covered sources may use emission
reduction credits from qualified domestic offset projects, subject to quantitative limits that depend on
the prevailing RGGI allowance price (RGGI 2007a).   At most, no more than 10 percent of a source’s
emissions can be covered by offsets.  When and if the RGGI allowance price exceeds a specific
threshold, which increases over time, sources have the additional option to use CERs and allowances
from other countries’ cap-and-trade systems, such as the EU ETS, in meeting their compliance
obligations.
8  However, sources are still required to cover at least 90 percent of their emissions with
RGGI allowances.9In his paper for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Denny Ellerman makes this point, as well as
a broader one, namely that the EU ETS provides a range of valuable lessons for the development of the post-2012
international policy architecture.  In addition to the linkages among EU Member States, two-way linkages were recently
established between the EU ETS and Norway’s emissions trading system, and between the EU ETS and systems in Iceland
and Liechtenstein (Ellerman 2008).
10Of course, linking also exposes participants to new sources of price volatility from other linked systems (McKibben and
Wilcoxen, 2007).
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4.3.2 The EU ETS as an Example of a Multilateral Two-way Linkage 
The European Commission has determined some aspects of the design of the EU ETS, such
as the sectors that are covered by the system, but the Member States have significant autonomy and
responsibility with respect to many other aspects of the system within their jurisdiction, including:
determining how many allowances to allocate; determining how to allocate allowances; and overseeing
the monitoring, verification, and reporting of emissions.  Thus, the EU ETS can be viewed as a
multilateral linkage among the Member States’ own systems, where a central authority enforces the
harmonization of certain characteristics of each system, and where allowances issued by any Member
State are recognized by all other Member States.
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5.  Implications of Linking
Linking tradable permit systems leads to diverse effects that need to be considered in assessing
the merits of particular linkages, as well as the merits of linkage as a major design element of the de jure
or de facto post-2012 international policy architecture.  These effects depend on the type of linkage
established and characteristics of the linked systems.
5.1 Benefits of Linkage
The most significant benefit of linking is the opportunity to lower the costs of achieving
emission reduction goals by shifting reductions among linked system in a manner that minimizes total
emission reduction costs.  A second benefit is that linking broadens the market for allowances and
credits, thereby improving market liquidity, reducing price volatility, and lessening market power
concerns.  If one or both of the linked systems is small, these benefits can be very important.
10  A third
benefit of linking is that it offers the opportunity for nations to establish “common but differentiated
responsibilities,” consistent with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(United Nations 1992), without increasing the cost of achieving global emission targets.  That is, as long
as two systems are linked, they can cost-effectively achieve a particular collective emissions target
regardless of how emission reduction responsibilities are initially allocated across those countries.  These
attributes of linking are likely to make it an important element of any cost-effective, long-run effort to
reduce GHG emissions in which tradable permit systems feature prominently.
Under certain circumstances, linking can also decrease global emissions by reducing emissions
leakage.  For example, linkage between a cap-and-trade system and a credit system reduces the cap-and-
trade system’s allowance price, and therefore decreases emissions leakage from that system.  In some
cases, this benefit may be substantial.  For example, leakage is a serious concern in the RGGI system11See the papers prepared for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements by:  Keeler and Thompson; Teng
and Chen; Plantinga and Richards; Cao; Kejun; Pizer, Hall, and Ueno; Shukla; Somanathan; and Victor.
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in the northeastern United States:  analyses have found that nearly half of the projected emission
reductions at covered plants could be offset by leakage (RGGI 2007b).  Thus, by reducing leakage from
the RGGI system, a link between that system and a credit system could reduce global emissions by
limiting leakage from the RGGI system. 
5.2 Concerns About Linkage
While linking may reduce global emissions in some circumstances, a potential concern about
linking is that — under other circumstances — it could increase global emissions.  For example, any
cap-and-trade system that establishes a one-way linkage with a credit system must confront the problem
of “additionality”:  some emission reduction credits offered by a credit system may not represent truly
additional emissions reductions because of the difficulty of establishing a baseline against which
reductions can be measured.  A considerable amount of research on credit systems, such as the CDM,
has focused on this problem.
11 Also, although linking can reduce overall emissions leakage under certain
circumstances, its effects on prices can increase leakage under other circumstances.
In some cases, the distributional implications of a link may be a source of concern.  Just as
international trade changes the prices faced by producers and consumers in different nations, allowance
trading across systems raises allowance prices in one of the linked systems and reduces prices in the
other system.  Hence, while yielding overall cost savings, linking can create both winners and losers.
Impacts on any participant firm depend on changes in the allowance price that the firm faces, and on
whether that firm is a net allowance buyer or seller.  Also, because changes in allowance prices affect
the prices of energy and other emissions-intensive goods, linkage can also have significant effects on
firms and households that do not directly participate in trading.  Likewise, by changing the production
costs of firms that are emissions-intensive or that rely on emissions-intensive inputs, linkage can have
significant effects on competitiveness.
The inter-system allowance trading resulting from linkage leads to capital flows between
countries.  Because any trading is voluntary, these capital flows necessarily are beneficial to the entities
involved in the trading, but others may object to some of these potentially large capital flows (Bradsher
2007; Summers 2007).  This has not been a problem in the EU ETS (Ellerman 2008), although to-date,
the capital flows within the EU ETS have been relatively small.
An additional concern related to linkage is that it can reduce national control over the design
and impacts of a domestic tradable permit system.  Once a system establishes links, its allowance price
and emissions consequences are influenced by developments in the linked system(s), including possibly
decisions made by the government(s) overseeing the linked system(s).  The degree to which linking
reduces a country’s control over its domestic system can depend in part on the relative size of the linked
systems.  While the post-link allowance price in linked systems will be between their pre-link prices, it
will tend to be closer to the larger system’s pre-link price.  For example, prior to linking with the EU
ETS, Norway was able to influence the allowance price in its system through its decisions about how
many allowances to issue and what sources to include under its cap.  Yet, given the size of Norway’s12At the same time, some elements of a cap-and-trade system’s design can have substantial effects on a linked system even
if the former system is significantly smaller than the latter system.  One such example is a safety valve. 
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system compared with that of the EU ETS, once the link was established, Norway’s decisions ceased
to have much impact on the allowance price that participants in its system face.
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Although linking can reduce a government’s control over its tradable permit system’s impacts,
that control already may be limited by connections with other systems through trade in emissions
intensive products.  The extent of such influences depends, among other factors, on the ease with which
emissions generating activity can shift between systems in response to differences between them.  For
example, if the European Union’s Member States had pursued separate, unlinked cap-and-trade systems
instead of creating the EU ETS, those systems nonetheless would have had a significant influence on
one another as a result of competition in emissions intensive product markets within Europe.  In
contrast, if cap and trade systems are established in Australia and the United States, absent a direct or
indirect link between them, these systems likely would have very little influence on one another.  In such
a case, the implications of linking for the control that each government has over its own system would
be more important.
A final concern about linkage is that it can alter the incentives that countries face with respect
to setting their future caps (Helm 2003; Holtsmark and Sommervoll 2008).  In particular, by changing
allowance prices in each of the linked systems, a linkage alters the tradeoff that a government faces
between the value it can create by issuing additional allowances, and the marginal environmental damage
that arises from issuing additional allowances.  Moreover, by expanding the scope of the allowance
market, linkages reduce the impact that the issuance of additional allowances has on allowance prices,
and therefore on the value of existing allowances.  
Of course, the issue of linkage reducing control over one’s domestic trading system is simply
a specific case of a general consequence of a nation opening itself to international trade of any kind.
The only way that  a country can maintain complete control over the price of any good it produces is
to isolate itself from the world economy, trading off increased control for decreased economic welfare.
5.3 Implications of Different Types of Linkages
The degree of control that a government can retain over its system depends in part on whether
linkage is one-way or two-way.  Two-way linkages can increase or decrease domestic allowance prices.
Also, two-way linkages lead to complete propagation of cost containment measures across the linked
systems, including safety valves and banking and borrowing provisions.  In contrast, one-way linkages
can only decrease the price of allowances in the system that establishes the link.  Likewise, one-way
linkages will only lead to propagation of cost containment measures in one direction — from the system
with which a link is established to the system that establishes the link.
The effects of a linkage also depend on whether it connects two cap-and-trade systems or a cap-
and-trade system and an emission-reduction-credit system.  For example, linkage that involves an
emission-reduction-credit system raises the issue of additionality.  On the other hand, a link between
two cap-and-trade systems can raise other concerns that may be less significant in a link with a credit13
system.  For example, the increase in allowance prices in one of two linked cap-and-trade systems may
have more far-reaching economic consequences  —  such as by increasing domestic energy prices —
than would the increase in credit prices resulting from a link between a cap-and-trade system and credit
system.
Even though (unconstrained) two-way linkages are more certain to equilibrate international
allowance prices, one-way links between cap-and-trade systems and a common (credit or cap-and-trade)
system can achieve some and perhaps much of the cost savings and risk diversification that could be
achieved by establishing direct two-way links among all of the cap-and-trade systems.  In fact, if the
common system has a sufficient supply of credits or allowances at a price below the least stringent cap-
and-trade system’s allowance price, one-way links between cap-and-trade systems and that common
system can cause allowance prices of all of the linked systems to converge.
6.  The Potential Role of Linkage in International Climate Policy Architecture
The potential role of linkage is limited by political and institutional factors.  In particular,
establishing direct linkages between cap-and-trade systems may require mutual recognition of emission
targets, harmonization of certain design elements, and agreement on procedures for making future
adjustments to the linked systems, including setting future emission caps.  Therefore, in the near-term,
some direct links will be less attractive and more difficult to establish than others.  However, direct
linkages between cap-and-trade systems and a common emission-reduction-credit system — and the
indirect linkages among cap-and-trade systems that would result — may achieve some, and perhaps
much, of the cost savings and other advantages of direct links among cap-and-trade systems.  As a
result, indirect linkages via an emission-reduction-credit system such as the CDM could become an
important part of the near-term international climate policy architecture.
6.1 Near Term Role
Links among existing tradable permit systems are already part of the international policy
architecture to address global climate change.  Moreover, new connections among existing and emerging
tradable permit systems will undoubtedly be established in the future. 
Pairs or groups of nations, particularly those which are important trading partners, will likely
establish direct two-way links between their respective cap-and-trade systems.  For example, Norway,
Iceland, and Liechtenstein have agreed to link their cap-and-trade systems with the EU ETS (Ellerman
2008).  However, for the reasons discussed above, it may take more time to establish direct links
between some cap-and-trade systems. At the same time, many of these cap-and-trade systems may
nonetheless become indirectly linked through direct links with a common credit system, such as the
CDM or some alternative, future protocol for emissions reduction credits in developing countries.
These direct and indirect linkages are currently serving as key operational elements of the
existing global climate policy architecture and may become increasingly important in the future.  In this
sense, linkage is emerging from the bottom up as a core element of the de facto international policy
architecture, which may carry beyond the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
in 2012.13For further discussion of critical issues associated with credit systems, we refer readers to other papers of the Harvard
Project on International Climate Agreements, including:  Agarwala 2008; Teng and Chen 2008; Cao 2008; Kejun 2008; Pizer,
Hall, and Euno 2008; Shukla 2008; Somanathan 2008; and Victor 2008.
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An important feature of such anticipated near-term linkage is that most cap-and-trade systems
may be connected with one another only through indirect links via a common emission-reduction-credit
system.  As a result, the presence of cost-containment mechanisms in one system will only affect
allowance prices in other systems via the effect of those mechanisms on competition among cap-and-
trade systems for credits from the emission-reduction-credit system.  That is, such indirect linkages will
not lead to the propagation of cost-containment mechanisms that can occur through explicit sales of
allowances among directly linked cap-and-trade systems.  
Although a near-term web of mostly indirect links may not result in a fully cost-effective global
market for GHG emission reductions, particularly in the near-term, these indirect links may still yield
much of the cost savings and other advantages of a comprehensive system of direct linkages.  Moreover,
these indirect links will not require the same degree of harmonization of cap-and-trade design elements
as would direct links.  However, the efficacy of this scenario depends heavily on widespread acceptance
and effectiveness of an international credit system such as the CDM.
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An international architecture consisting solely of linkages would not guarantee broad participation,
but as we explore below in section 7.2, some forms of linkage may induce participation,  encourage
compliance, and even lead to more stringent commitments.
6.2 Long Term Role
It is possible that a comprehensive set of linkages, combined with unilateral emissions reduction
commitments by many nations, could function as a stand-alone climate architecture.  Such a bottom-up
architecture could emerge as more countries establish national cap-and-trade systems and begin to seek
the gains from linking with other systems.  These countries also might use the prospect of linkages as
a means of providing incentives to developing countries to participate in an international agreement. 
A second possibility is that a collection of bottom-up linkages might serve as a natural starting
point in negotiations leading to a top-down agreement.  An existing system of linkages may help to
develop the experience and mutual trust necessary for global negotiations to succeed.  Furthermore, as
we discuss below, any future agreement is likely to be heavily influenced by the status quo system of
existing linkages and institutional investments.  
A third possibility — not mutually exclusive with the second — is that linkage could become
an element of a larger global policy architecture.  Because the trade-related cost savings available to
linked systems will grow as countries adopt increasingly stringent targets, there are strong economic
reasons for policy makers to favor linking.  Thus, a future global architecture could incorporate a set
direct links among domestic cap-and-trade systems as a key design element.15
7.  Evaluation of the Role of Linkage in International Policy Architecture
We assess three ways in which linkage can contribute to future climate policy architecture:  as
an independent, bottom-up architecture; as a transition to a top down architecture; and as an element
of a larger climate agreement.  Our assessment is both positive and normative, as we identify the likely
outcomes in each case, and evaluate these outcomes based on a set of normative criteria.
7.1 Linkage as a Bottom-up International Policy Architecture
 
Bilateral linkages are likely to continue to evolve among national and regional cap-and-trade
systems and the CDM (or its successor).  Could such a set of linkages, established without central
coordination, function as an effective, stand-alone bottom-up international policy architecture?
Although such an architecture would need to include certain other design elements, including
emissions reduction commitments and participation incentives, its distinguishing feature would be that
it would grow organically from direct and indirect linkages.  Indeed, if international negotiations for a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol were unsuccessful, then a set of bilateral linkages could well become
the de facto post-2012 architecture.  We assess this architecture in terms of its likely (1) environmental
performance, (2) cost effectiveness, and (3) distributional equity.
The degree to which a system of bottom-up linkages could satisfy our first criterion of
meaningful environmental performance depends on whether: (a) participants set sufficient
environmental targets; (b) a sufficient number of key countries participate; and (c) participants comply.
With regard to whether participants will set meaningful environmental targets, commitments
to reduce emissions in an architecture of bottom-up linkages would result from unilateral decisions by
individual nations, or from negotiations among small groups of nations.  In developed countries,
internal political support would probably be the driving force behind adoption of more stringent
emission caps (Keohane and Raustiala 2008), whereas in developing nations, adoption of emissions caps
could depend upon incentives provided by committed developed countries.
As described above, direct linkages between cap-and-trade systems can affect the incentives that
countries face in setting their future caps.  To address the possibility that linking may create incentives
for some countries to adopt less stringent future caps, countries could negotiate cap trajectories as a
condition for linking (Flachsland et al. 2008).  On the other hand, a system of linkages has the advantage
that cost savings from links may allow some countries to adopt more aggressive targets than they
otherwise would.
With respect to whether an architecture of bottom-up linkages would generate participation
from a sufficient number of key countries, industrialized country participation is likely to be high.  As
emphasized above, many countries and regions have begun to move toward setting up meaningful
cap-and-trade systems and some links have already been established.  On the other hand, participation
by developing countries will most likely be conditional on participation incentives provided by
industrialized countries.14To ensure compliance, a bottom-up system of linkages would need all trading partners to have comparably effective
internal monitoring, reporting, and enforcement mechanisms.  Harmonization of such measures is likely to occur during
the negotiation of the terms of direct linkages.
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Positive participation incentives (“carrots”) could take at least three forms.  One is access to
demand for the emissions credits that a developing country could produce.  In fact, the CDM provides
such incentives.  The second is the potential gain from becoming a net seller of allowances.  The third
is side payments in the form of technical or development assistance.  In contrast, negative participation
incentives (“sticks”) could take two forms.  First, industrialized countries could establish border carbon
taxes and/or import allowance requirements (Frankel 2008; Houser et al. 2008; Stavins 2008).  Second,
access to international markets for permits could be conditioned on participation and graduation.  No
matter what incentives are considered, however, a bottom-up system on its own may not provide the
institutional structure necessary to coordinate such participation incentives.  
With respect to whether participants would be likely to comply in an architecture of  bottom-up
linkage, the picture is no worse — and perhaps better than — for some top-down, centralized
architectures.  In contrast to the Kyoto approach, which leaves the implementation of international
targets up to each member state, a bottom-up system would include industrialized nations where
domestic institutions are sufficient to enforce compliance.  It would also include developing nations
where international carrots and sticks, such as revenue from permit sales and the threat of loss of access
to markets for emissions credits, outweigh the costs of participating. As a result, an advantage of a
bottom-up system of linkages, compared with a top-down system, is that it provides no incentive for
countries to make commitments they do not intend to achieve.
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The second major criterion by which we can assess an architecture of bottom-up linkage is
cost-effectiveness.  This is straightforward.  Because links among cap-and-trade systems create gains
from trade for the participanting countries, such an architecture has the potential to be cost-effective,
in that it can allow countries to achieve their collective emission targets at minimum cost.  This would
be the case if the bottom-up system of linkages includes a sufficient set of direct two-way links, or if that
system of linkages relies primarily on indirect links through a common credit system that has an
adequate supply of low-cost credits to bring about allowance price convergence.
A third important criterion is distributional equity.  As was described above, linkages can create
both winners and losers within each of the linked systems, and will bring about capital flows among
linked systems.  The political implications of these distributional effects are not obvious.  First, the
distributional implications of linkages will depend in part on how individual countries choose to allocate
allowances in their own cap-and-trade systems.  Also, while the political will to participate in a system
of linkages will depend in part on the distribution of costs and benefits, it is unclear whether individual
political systems will give greater weight to costs and benefits that are concentrated in particular
industries or distributed broadly across an entire economy.
A bottom-up system of linkage is already evolving, and could function well in the near-term in
the absence of a top-down post-2012 international policy architecture.  However, for a bottom-up
system to achieve meaningful long-term environmental performance, it will require the major emitters
— the United States, the European Union, Russia, Japan, China, India, and other key countries — to15Another way in which existing links may influence a future climate agreement is by providing a series of experiments to
test different approaches (Hahn 1998).  Victor et al. (2005) argue that such as “Madisonian” approach could provide future
climate negotiations with valuable insights about what features of linked trading systems do and do not work.
16We are grateful to Denny Ellerman for this point and for much of the discussion that follows.
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reach an agreement regarding emissions targets and incentives for participation.  Without the
cooperation of these countries, it is unlikely that global greenhouse gas emissions could be reduced by
enough to prevent major climate change.  Of course, if such cooperation were possible in the context
of a bottom-up system, then it would presumably also be possible within a top-down system.
7.2 Bottom-up Linkage as a Step Towards a Top-down Architecture
A collection of linkages among cap-and-trade and emission-reduction-credit systems could serve
as the foundation for a top-down climate agreement  Indeed, a bottom-up system could evolve into a
coherent top-down climate architecture, much as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade paved
the way for the World Trade Organization (Carraro 2007).  Questions of interest include whether such
a decentralized system of linkages might create momentum towards a top-down agreement, and how
existing linkages would then affect any resulting negotiated arrangement.
Any pre-existing direct or indirect links are likely to influence the evolution of a new top-down
international agreement, because existing links will function as the status-quo framework.  Because
linkage creates winners and losers, some constituencies will resist changes, while others may welcome
them.  Changing the economic, organizational, and political infrastructure that facilitates existing
linkages would be time-consuming and costly.  More broadly, the existing system is a natural starting
point for negotiations.  Of course, bias towards the status quo caused by institutional inertia could also
impair good decision making and impede negotiations, particularly if the existing system of links
includes features that are undesirable from the standpoint of reaching a broader climate agreement.  This
very flaw may also be an advantage, however, for political reasons, because nations may be more willing
to make commitments to a system in which they already participate.
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An existing set of links will also have implications for participation in a future international
agreement.  In particular, links will create constituencies within some developing countries that favor
an international agreement if continued demand for credits is conditioned on movement toward such
an international agreement.  If these stakeholders are influential within their own countries, then linkage
can foster incentives for countries to participate in a future international agreement.
Linkage may also encourage participation in a future international agreement by simplifying the
negotiation process.  One of the great challenges of international climate negotiations is the necessity
of achieving agreement among many parties with exceptionally diverse interests.  Linkages can help to
mitigate this problem by creating natural negotiating blocks of nations with similar interests.  The
negotiations necessary to establish bilateral links can contribute to subsequent negotiation of an
international agreement.
 
There is another way in which linkage can induce participation in a broader international, if not
global, regime.
16  Consider a “leader nation,” which can accomplish very little to solve the global18
problem of climate change were it to act on its own.  Linkage provides a mechanism by which that
nation’s emission reduction activities can be extended more widely.  Although shunning, shaming, or
punishing non-participant nations is one potential route to trying to broaden the coalition (Keohane and
Raustiala 2008), linkage could offer another route.
This is illustrated by the evolution of certain provisions of the EU ETS.  The system places
“supplementarity” constraints on imports of credits from the CDM, and allows for mutual recognition
of other cap-and-trade systems established by Kyoto signatories.  Amendments proposed in January
2008 introduce two key changes (Ellerman 2008).  First, the ability of EU ETS participants to import
credits after 2012 would be contingent on there being a post-2012 international agreement, leaving the
door open for some form of graduation requirement.  Second, mutual recognition provisions would no
longer require signature of the Kyoto Protocol, but simply the presence of a mandatory cap on
emissions in the linked jurisdiction.  Thus, while the CDM route is made conditional on future
agreements, full mutual recognition would be opened up for any cap-and-trade system.  In other words,
market access is being used to induce participation, and to foster a broader system. Linkage is being used
by “the leader” to induce participation in the global regime.
Linkage can also encourage compliance with a future international agreement.  This could occur
in two ways.  First, the “Madisonian workshop” created by many uncoordinated links could provide
policy experience with mechanisms for encouraging compliance (Victor et al. 2005).  Second, existing
links might allow countries to demonstrate good faith commitments to emissions reductions.
Linking may even lead to more stringent environmental commitments.  By reducing the cost of
emissions reductions, linkage may allow key industrialized countries to make greater emissions reduction
commitments than they would have in the absence of linking.  Linkage may reduce domestic opposition
to reductions in emissions caps as the allowance price impact associated with such reductions would be
mitigated by linkages.
7.3 Bottom-up Linkage as an Element of an International Architecture
Linkage could play a significant role as a component of a larger international climate policy
architecture — a role that would not conflict with the potential near-term role of linkage as the basis
for a future agreement.  Since not all links function in the same way, an international policy architecture
could be developed with different near-term and long-term linkage components.  For example, in the
near-term, a system of indirect linkages via a common credit system would provide important cost
savings, while minimizing negative distributional effects and preserving a high degree of national control
over allowance markets.  In the longer term, the system could transition to negotiated multilateral
two-way linkages that would create a single, comprehensive market for allowances and credits. 
8.  How Will Near term Climate Negotiations Affect Bottom-up Linkages?
If the emergence of a system of linkages would be beneficial to a future (bottom-up or
top-down) climate agreement, then it is important to address two questions.  What policy elements of
a future international climate agreement will facilitate bottom-up linkages?  And what policy elements
would inhibit or impede such linkage?17Some of these elements could also emerge without a post-2012 multi-national climate agreement, but instead through
specific bilateral links among systems.
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A post-2012 international climate agreement could include several elements that would facilitate
future linkages among cap-and-trade and emission-reduction-credit systems.  First, the agreement could
establish an agreed trajectory of emissions caps or allowance prices.  Second,  it could specify a
harmonized set of cost-containment measures, including offset, banking and borrowing, and safety-valve
provisions.  Third, it could specify a process for making future adjustments to the level of the emissions
cap and other key design elements (Jaffe and Stavins 2007).  Fourth, it could create an international
clearinghouse for transaction records and allowance auctions (Edenhofer et al. 2007).    Fifth, it could
provide for the on-going operation of the CDM or a successor, which could play a central role in
indirectly linking existing and emerging tradable permit systems.  Sixth and finally, a post-2012
international climate agreement could help build capacity in developing countries that would permit and
encourage their fuller participation through a system of bottom-up linkage.  All of these features would
simplify and facilitate the linkage negotiation process.
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There are also potential design elements that would best be avoided by a post-2012 agreement
if it seeks to encourage linkage among tradable permit systems.  Any global agreement that encourages
strategic behavior could impede the development of linkages.  For example, an agreement that
conditions future commitments on countries’ emissions levels over the coming years could undermine
the ability of linkages to achieve a cost-effective distribution of emission reductions across linked
systems.  Also, depending on the stringency of such restrictions, an international agreement that imposes
“supplementarity” restrictions — in which countries must achieve some specified percentage of
emissions reductions on their own, without trading — will  severely limit the potential benefits of
linkage by curtailing the amount of international trading that can occur.
9.  Conclusions
Cap-and-trade systems are emerging as a preferred domestic instrument for reducing emissions
of greenhouse gases in many parts of the world, and the Clean Development Mechanism has developed
a substantial constituency, despite some concerns about its performance.  Because of the considerable
political and economic pressure to link these systems, linkage may be expected to play a de facto, if not
de jure, role in any future international climate policy architecture.
In the near-term, linkage will continue to grow in importance as a core element of a bottom-up,
de facto international policy architecture.  The EU ETS has already established direct links with systems
in neighboring countries, and the CDM has emerged as a potential hub for indirect links among
cap-and-trade systems worldwide.  As new cap-and-trade systems appear in countries such as Australia,
Canada, and the United States, the global network of direct and indirect links will likely continue to
spread.
In the longer term, linkage could play a variety of roles.  One possibility is that a set of linkages,
combined with unilateral emissions reduction commitments by many nations, could function as a
stand-alone climate architecture.  Such a system would be cost-effective as long as it included a sufficient20
number of direct two-way links or indirect links through a common international credit system with an
adequate depth of low-cost credits.  However, it may be difficult for a system of bottom-up linkages to
achieve meaningful long-term environmental performance, primarily because it would lack a
coordinating mechanism to encourage widespread participation. 
A second long-term possibility is that a collection of bottom-up links may eventually evolve into
a comprehensive, top-down agreement.  In the near-term, a system of direct and indirect linkages would
build institutional capacity and provide important cost savings, and in the longer term, the system would
serve as a natural starting point in negotiations leading to a top-down agreement.
A third long-term possibility (which is entirely compatible with the second possibility) is that
linkage could play a significant role as a component of a larger international climate policy agreement.
Such an architecture would use linkage to provide a number of important benefits, reducing the overall
costs of meeting emissions reduction targets, improving market liquidity, and providing a framework
for the implementation of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”
Despite the clear benefits of linkage, there are also legitimate concerns about the implications
of some linkages.  These concerns depend, in part, on the type of linkage involved.  Two-way direct
links among cap-and-trade systems reduce the control that the linking countries have over their
domestic allowance prices and emissions.  Two-way links also result in the complete and automatic
propagation of cost-containment measures from one system to the other.  On the other hand, indirect
links present a different set of concerns.  In particular, indirect linkage via a common credit system
could adversely affect global emissions if additionality problems in the credit system are severe.  The
interim performance of the CDM suggests that this concern deserves serious attention. 
Thus, there is a glaring trade-off between direct linkages, which can require a high degree of
harmonization and international cooperation, and indirect linkages via a common credit system, which
raise concerns about additionality.  This tradeoff may suggest a natural progression.  In the near-term,
indirect linkage of cap-and-trade systems via a common credit system (such as the CDM) could achieve
some of the cost savings and risk diversification of direct linkage, but without the need for as much
harmonization of emerging and existing cap-and-trade systems.  Such indirect linkage would also  limit
potential distributional concerns and preserve a high degree of national control over allowance markets.
In the longer term, international negotiations could establish shared expectations about environmental
targets and emission reduction responsibilities that would serve as the basis for a broad set of
multilateral, direct links among cap-and-trade systems.  This progression could  promote the near-term
goals of participation and cost-effectiveness, while helping to build the foundation for a more
comprehensive future agreement.21
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